Global drug policy: A hamster in a wheel or two dogs fighting for a bone? by Schim van der Loeff, Lily
 1 
 
 
 
 
Global drug policy 
A hamster in a wheel or two dogs fighting for a bone? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lily Schim van der Loeff 
International Studies 2016-2017 
S1639811 
lilysvdl@gmail.com 
Supervisor: Dr. O’Malley 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.   Introduction 3 
2.   Theoretical framework 
3.   Methodology 
5 
8 
4.   Historical context 9 
5.   An era of polarisation 11 
6.   The trade-off 14 
7.   The crack in the consensus 17 
8.   A wide-ranging debate 20 
9.   An open debate 22 
10.  Conclusion 24 
11.  Policy Recommendations for UNGASS 2019 
12.  Bibliography 
26 
27 
 3 
1.   Introduction 
 
Global drug policy is in crisis. Despite UN conventions mandating strict international 
prohibition, more and more states have begun to stray from the prohibition path and making 
national drug policies more lenient (Bewley-Taylor 2003: 1). The first country to legalise the 
production and sale of marijuana was Uruguay, disregarding the existing UN drug treaty 
framework. Even within the US, the once ‘uncontested champion of a hard line punitive 
global counternarcotic regime’, federal prohibitive drug laws find themselves at odds 
with individual state drug policies. Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington1 have 
legalised both recreational and medical marijuana even though under the federal Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 marijuana is illegal (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas 2015: 10). The 
latest public assault on the current drug control system was made in March 2016 by former 
heads of state, academics and business people; publishing a collection of essays titled: 
‘Ending the war on drugs’ (The Economist, March 24th 2016). The authors claim that the 
current framework of global drug policy is a ‘political, economic and public-health failure’. 
They conclude that with an estimated cost of $100 billion per year, the war against drugs has 
not driven down consumption. Instead it has stimulated a $300 billion a year industry. Any 
hope, however, of changing UN conventions has been impeded by a number of nations that 
remain ‘firmly against even tentative reform’ (The Economist, March 24th 2016). Opposition 
to the punitive global drug policy is rising and demands for reform are coming at the UN 
from multiple fronts.  
 
Global drug policy has reached a crossroads. By legalising marijuana and making drug laws 
more lenient, some countries have blatantly disregarded the UN drug treaty system. Others 
have instead chosen to strictly enforce prohibition, using methods not approved by all2. As 
the UN pursues a unified approach, polarisation between those in favour and those against the 
current UN drug treaty system increases. Important benchmarks in the drug policy debate are 
                                                
1 When writing this thesis, California, Massachusetts and Nevada passed measures legalizing recreational 
marijuana (nov 2016), which will soon take effect. Twenty-six other states have laws legalizing marijuana in a 
different form than recreational.  
Retrieved 5 December: http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-
recreational.html 
 
2 More than 2,500 people have been killed in 2016 between the 1st of July 1 and September 5th during President 
Duterte's bloody war on drugs in the Philippines.  
Retrieved 5 December: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/09/philippines-duterte-killer-drug-war-
160905094258461.html 
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the United Nations Special Sessions (UNGASS) on drugs, when the General Assembly (GA) 
reviews the performance of the UN drug control system. Two of the special sessions took 
place in 1990 and 1998. The next UNGASS took place almost eighteen years later in 2016 
and the GA will continue the discussion in 2019. This renewed attention, after almost two 
decades of oblivion, highlights the need of the international community to revisit the debate 
on global drug policy in a time of mounting polarisation. 
 
In 2013, on the International Day against Drug Abuse and illicit Trafficking, former UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged member states to pursue a ‘wide-ranging and open 
debate’ on drug policy (Ban-Kimoon, New York: 26 June 2013). For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will define ‘open’ as: ‘not restricted to a particular group or category of participants’ 
and ‘wide-ranging’ as: ‘including many different ideas, actions or things’ (Merriam Webster). 
I will focus on which actors and what ideas influence UN drug policy-making. Discussing 
these two aspects of drug policy, allows us to better understand the development of drug 
policy in the prelude to UNGASS 2019.  
 
This brings me to the research question of this thesis; to what extent has the global drug 
policy debate become more wide-ranging and open throughout the United Nations special 
sessions of 1990, 1998 and 2016?  
 
The first part of the thesis briefly reviews the academic literature on the multilateral context 
global drug policy was formulated in. The second part addresses the methodology used and 
discusses the historical context of global drug policy. The third part of the thesis, the core, is 
an examination of the proceedings at the three special sessions on drugs and will be followed 
by an analysis of the recurring themes. In the conclusion I will discuss the extent to which the 
UN drug policy debate has become more wide-ranging and open throughout the three special 
sessions. This will allow me to suggest policy recommendations for UNGASS 2019. 
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2.   Theoretical framework 
 
To begin with, it is important to situate global drug policy-making in the multilateral context 
in which it was initiated, negotiated and drafted. A key element of this thesis is therefore a 
review of broader scholarly efforts to conceptualize multilateralism. Traditionally, 
international relations specialists have focused on states as protagonists in multilateral policy-
making (Weiss e.a. 2009: 124). Since the 1970s, however, the United Nations has organised 
many global summits on an array of different topics, which have ‘spawned complex 
multilateral diplomacy’ since (Karns & Mingst 2004: 13). The presence of well-organised 
NGO’s, scientific experts, corporations and other interested individuals with a strong 
lobbying power, has forced IR scholars to recognize the presence of actors besides states 
(Weiss e.a. 2009: 124). This has led to an academic debate on who participates in multilateral 
policy-making and in what way (Karns & Mingst 2004: 13). Looking, respectively, at which 
actors and what ideas influence multilateral policy-making, creates a better understanding of 
how global drug policy has been shaped throughout the years. 
 
The United Nations is a multilateral institution: an institution that facilitates the ‘relations 
among three or more states in accordance with certain principles’ (Ruggie 1992: 568). The 
adherence to a collective set of agreed upon principles is what distinguishes multilateral 
cooperation from regular cooperation between states. These principles are created to 
‘prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity’, but most importantly shape expectations 
between member states (Keohane 1990: 732). The largest multilateral platform is the United 
Nations and the 193 member states have agreed on common principles of conduct as 
described in the United Nations Charter. The Charter stipulates that the UN strives to be a 
‘centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends’ (UN 
Charter 1945: Chapter I, Article 1). Moreover, the UN Charter contains the formal 
procedures for member states to work towards those commons ends through a ‘single 
negotiating text and goal’; i.e. multilateral policy (Lodge & Carpenter 2013: 41). This means 
that within the largest existing multilateral platform, the member states are the protagonists 
for deciding on global policy (Karns & Mingst 2004: 15).  
 
Even though states are the formal actors at the UN, academics have extensively addressed 
how non-state actors influence ‘UN thinking, policies, priorities, and actions’ (Jolly e.a. 
2009: 33). Instead of focussing on the UN as a product of its ‘rigid formal structures’, the 
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time has come to look at it ‘in terms of free-flowing networks’ (Weiss e.a. 2009: 124). 
Multilateral decisions are no longer the direct result of multilateral cooperation between 
multiple states as dictated by the code of conduct set by the United Nations Charter. Rather, 
the increasing importance of non-state actors has ‘gradually forced many main-stream IR 
theorists to pry open the lid on the black box of state-centric theories of international 
organization’ (Weiss e.a. 2009: 124). Weiss e.a. argue therefore that when considering 
participation at the UN, an additional UN should be considered consisting of ‘certain 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), external experts, scholars, consultants, and 
committed citizens who work closely with the UN’s intergovernmental machinery and 
secretariats’ (Weiss e.a. 2009: 123). The UN is therefore no longer a merely state-centric 
platform, as outside of the UN, there is a part of the UN that exerts influence on its policy-
making process. 
 
Even though non-state actors receive increasing attention at the multilateral level, the UN 
structure and rules were shaped in a post-war era. A system was put in place where states 
were considered the relevant, if not only, actors in a multilateral setting. State sovereignty lies 
at the heart of the UN Charter (UN Charter 1945: Chapter I, Article 2). Therefore, member 
states of the UN have authority ‘not only over their own territory and people, but also over 
powers delegated to international institutions’ (Karns & Mingst 2004: 15). The US emerged 
as a victor of World War II, but more importantly as one of two victors with a military and 
economy largely intact. This made the country self-sufficient in a time where other countries 
where interdependent and could not heedlessly pave their own political path. As the Cold 
War ended in 1991, the bipolar world order changed to unipolar. The US was ‘the only 
country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in 
any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself’ (Krauthammer 1990: 
24). The centre of world power became the ‘unchallenged superpower, the United States, 
attended by its Western allies’ and this had a profound effect on the direction global policy 
took (Krauthammer 1990: 23). The US ‘used its dominant position [..] to shape much of the 
structure and rules of the post-war international system’ (Karns & Mingst 2004: 15). This 
dominant position is most obvious when looking at the Security Council, but can also be 
noted in the earliest treaties and resolutions that still hold true to this day. Moreover, some 
scholars argue that even though US power has been substantially declining and challenged by 
other economic heavyweights such as Brazil and China, ‘no great-power rival or set of rivals 
has emerged to challenge the United States’ (Haass 2008: 48). The United States still is and 
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‘will remain the largest single aggregation of power’ (Haass 2008: 46). As a result, to this 
day ‘US interests (and often European as well) are accommodated in many regimes’ through 
the UN policy-making system (Karns & Mingst 2004: 30).  
 
It is safe to say that ‘multilateralism in the 21st century is, like the century itself, likely to be 
more fluid and, at times, messy than what we are used to’ (Haass 2010). Even though the 
initial set-up of the UN was based on a post-war balance of power, increasing globalisation 
has made the international pecking order more diffuse. The global interconnectedness of 
nations has created challenges of transnational scale that can no longer be addressed by 
member states alone (Weiss e.a. 2009: 139). Therefore, it is paramount that governments look 
outside of the box and allow non-state actors to influence policy-making; moving ‘beyond 
what passes for received wisdom in governments and secretariats’ (Weiss e.a. 2009: 133). 
Ideas presented by non-state actors are not dependent on re-election or limited by a specific 
mandate as the primary loyalty goes to the idea not to an electorate. By considering ideas of 
non-state actors in conjunction with those of member states, out-of-the-box thinking is 
combined with ‘knowledge with political punch and access to decision-makers’ (Weiss e.a. 
2009: 133). So even though these parties take no formal part in voting procedures and 
diplomatic discussion, non-state actors can influence the process of ‘advocacy, research, 
policy analysis’ but most importantly; that of idea-mongering (Weiss e.a. 2009: 123). The 
importance of non-state actors lies in presenting independent thought and therefore coming 
up with ‘new ideas and information, and mobilize public opinion around UN deliberations 
and operations’ (Weiss e.a. 2009: 123). It is no longer sufficient to address issues of a global 
scale by member states, let alone one superpower.  
When regarding the past and the future of global drug policy, it is important to see it in the 
light of the academic debate on who and what influences UN policy-making. By looking 
which actors and ideas influence the policy-making at the UN, we gain better understanding 
of how global drug policy has developed and in what direction it might further develop.  
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3.   Methodology 
 
This research will combine process tracing and discourse analysis to provide a well-argued 
answer to the research question, allowing for different perspectives and approaches to sustain 
my argument. I have chosen the research method of process tracing to analyse how global 
drug policy has unfolded over time. I have selected the United Nations Special Sessions 
(UNGASS) as a series to analyse. An UNGASS is a key UN mechanism that can review 
global drug policy specifically with the entire GA present. The United Nations Special 
Sessions held three on the world drug problem. The Special Session on drugs of 1990, 1998 
and 2016 are the temporal sequences used in order to conduct the process tracing. In order to 
recognise recurring discursive patterns that form part of the drug policy debate, I will also 
analyse some of the discourse in the relevant literature inasmuch as it explains recurring 
themes in the international drug policy discussion. 
 
The first three chapters will focus on accurately describing the special sessions as a specific 
series. In order to trace the process of the special sessions, it is important to take a snapshot 
of each of the special sessions and compare them to each other in different points in time 
(Collier 2011: 824). These are the key moments that allow me to conduct a proper analysis of 
change and sequence over time. It will permit me to assess if certain conditions during these 
meetings have led to a more wide-ranging and open debate throughout UNGASS 1990, 1998 
and 2016. Based on the diagnostic evidence provided by the UNGASS 1990, 1998 and 2016, 
the proceeding two chapters will look at the causal relation of the three special sessions 
(Collier 2011: 824). 
 
The fourth and the fifth chapter of this thesis will look at the recurring discussion on the 
influence of specific actors and ideas that have emerged during the three special sessions. In 
order to limit the scope of this thesis, I will focus on recurring themes that specifically 
influence the wide-ranging or open character of the UN drug policy mechanism, focusing 
specifically on the influence of ideas and non-state actors.  
 
The data for this thesis will be acquired through a literature study. I will rely on qualitative 
data ranging from UN treaties and resolutions, reports, academic literature, policy briefs, 
national and international policy documents and newspaper articles.  
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4.   Historical context 
 
The current global drug strategy based on prohibition can be led back to a US led initiative of 
the early twentieth century. In an attempt to recreate the alcohol prohibition scheme, the US 
pursued an international judicial framework to control psychoactive substances (Jelsma3 and 
Armenta 2015: 1). Despite significant US effort, other colonial powers objected to a punitive 
and prohibition oriented approach as their territories overseas profited greatly from the opium 
trade. When the US emerged as a victor of World War II, it was in a position to create a 
prohibitionist global drug regime and pressure governments suffering the post-war 
consequences to acquiescence (Jelsma & Armenta 2015: 2). This was facilitated by the fact 
that drug control was no priority for most states, allowing considerable monopolisation of the 
prohibition-oriented coalition (Bewley-Taylor e.a. 2016: 4). 
 
Ultimately US political power and will led to the three major UN drug conventions. The first 
treaty, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, was negotiated in the 1940s and 
1950s, consolidating previous efforts for drug regulation into a single treaty (Thoumi 2016: 
19). The treaty focuses largely on coca, cocaine, opium, heroin and cannabis, i.e. plant-based 
drugs (Jelsma 2003: 182). This type of control was introduced based on the idea that 
‘narcotic drugs should be considered hazardous unless and until proven not to be’ (Sinha 
2001: 26). The US ended up rejecting the Single Convention, accusing it of being ‘too 
permissive’ (Collins 2016: 12). The subsequent US administrations side-lined drug 
prohibition efforts until the cocaine-boom and crack-epidemic hit the Western Hemisphere in 
the second half of the twentieth century4. 
 
Due to the increase in drug-related deaths, the attention of the US State Department returned 
to the world drug problem. The US congress ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs in 1967 and in 1971 President Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs. The Nixon 
administration vowed to take ‘additional steps to strike at the supply side of the drug equation 
[..] beyond our borders’ (Nixon, Washington: 17 June 1971). This was the start of aggressive 
US diplomacy and a process in which extensive resources were allocated to drug prohibition 
                                                
3 Martin Jelsma is a political scientist, specialised in Latin America and international drugs policy who 
coordinates TNI's Drugs & Democracy Programme. TNI was part of the Civil Society Task Force on Drugs for 
UNGASS, which has allowed them to closely monitor the UN drug policy making process. This means that 
even though these are not first-hand sources, the knowledge obtained is often first hand. 
 
4 Retrieved 5 December 2016: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/4.Cocaine.pdf	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abroad (Collins 2016: 12). The US exerted considerable pressure on states and responsible 
UN bodies to follow suit (Collins 2016: 12). As the drug industry grew exponentially, the 
1971 Convention of Psychotropic Substances followed the 1961 Convention (Collins 2016: 
12). The 1971 drug treaty was principally concerned with synthetic drugs from the 
pharmaceutical industry (Jelsma 2003: 182). The third drug treaty, the Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, features comprehensive 
measures on the criminal aspect of the drug trade such as money laundering and agreements on the 
extradition of drug traffickers (1988 Convention). The three drug treaties enjoy a high level of 
adherence; 183 out of 193 UN member states are signatories to the 1961 and 1971 drug treaties 
and 182 to the 1988 Convention Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(IDPC 2007: 2). By the end of the eighties a global treaty framework had developed, 
reflected in the UN treaties of 1961, 1971 and 1988, and initially set in motion by the US 
(Collins 2016: 12). The UN sits at the control panel of global drug policy through a treaty 
framework the US put in place. 
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5.   An era of polarisation  
 
The UN General Assembly can convene outside of the annual meeting schedule, if the 
security council or a majority of member states requests it (UN Charter 1945: Chapter IV, 
Article 20). Special sessions are meant to build on ‘political momentum’ to obtain changes in 
the way the ‘international community addresses a global problem’ (Jelsma 2015: 3). Thirty 
such special sessions have taken place since the UN was founded, and three were dedicated 
to the world drug problem. The first of these three, took place in 1990, against the backdrop 
of an increasingly militarised and cross-border war on drugs but also a newly institutionalised 
global drug policy. The war on drugs as well as global drug policy framework centred on 
prohibition and persecution. The system was initiated, strongly embraced and promoted by 
the United States (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas 2015: 4). In spite of wide adherence to the 
treaties, during the last decade of the twentieth century, it became clear that the interests of 
producing and consuming countries were diverging (Caulkins 2013: 4). Consuming countries 
blamed ‘source and transhipment countries for supplying the drugs’. Producing countries in 
turn countered by noting that the United States and Europe accounted for the bulk of the 
demand (Caulkins 2013: 3). The treaty framework, however, was ‘largely compatible with 
pre-existing legal systems in North America and Western Europe’ (Jojarth 2009: 102). This 
meant that production countries were persuaded to alter their narcotics policies to stricter 
standards, ‘prevailing in such states as the US’ (Bewley-Taylor 1990). As a result, producing 
states ‘feared international anti-drug efforts not only for their harmful impact on their 
country’s economy but also for negative repercussion on their fragile political stability’ 
(Jojarth 2009: 104). In short, the producing countries were worried by the economic and 
political costs of prohibitionist policy whereas as consuming nations had relatively little to 
adjust (Jojarth 2009: 102). 
 
The Colombian president kicked off an era of finger-pointing at the annual meeting of the 
general assembly in 1989 (Barco Vargas, New York: 5 October 1989). He called upon all 
member states of the UN to take their responsibility in the drug trade, stating how: ‘every 
tactic and every weapon in the war against narcotics pales into insignificance compared with 
the need to reduce demand’ (Barco Vargas, New York: 5 October 1989). The president 
received a standing ovation when he declared that: ‘those who consume cocaine are 
contributing to the assassination of my people by the criminal drug cartels’ (ibid.) By 
publicly assigning blame to consumer countries, president Barco Vargas demonstrated the 
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widespread feeling that the existing drug policy framework reflected the interests of 
consuming nations (ibid.). In this spirit, president Barco Vargas put forward a motion to 
organise a UNGASS to discuss international cooperation on reducing demand. To ensure a 
certain level of impartiality, Barco Vargas also suggested the establishment of an expert 
working group at ministerial level to re-evaluate and coordinate anti-narcotic initiatives 
(Barco Vargas, New York: 5 October 1989).  
 
In February 1990 the first UNGASS on Drug Abuse took place and the official objective was 
to encourage the global implementation of the 1988 UN Convention (Jelsma 2015: 2). The 
GA adopted a political declaration, agreeing to ‘protect mankind from the scourge of drug 
abuse and illicit trafficking’ (A/RES/S-17/2). The choice of the word ‘scourge’ highlighted 
the manner in which drugs were regarded at that moment in time; as ‘something that causes a 
great amount of trouble or suffering’ (Merriam Webster). Use of such words allowed 
governments to publically ‘crusade against drugs’ and blame them for any 
unfortunate political circumstances (Levine 2003: 147). Words such as ‘scourge’ would 
be used to ‘popularise images of drugs as highly contagious invading evils’ (Levine 2003: 
147). At the UNGASS the period from 1991 to 2000 was declared the UN Decade Against 
Drug Abuse, marking the pursuit of drug free world (A/RES/S-17/2). This objective united 
former Cold War adversaries and powerhouses, such as the US, Russia and China, creating a 
prohibitionist coalition consisting of political superpowers (Jelsma 2015: 4). This 
strengthened the global expansion of the US-led militarisation of the world drug problem at 
UN level.  
 
The UN Decade Against Drug Abuse drugs created a sense of optimism in the aftermath 
UNGASS 1990. Despite this early optimism, it was during that same UN Decade Against 
Drug Abuse that again ‘profound differences of opinion emerged, complicating the 
preparations for the second UNGASS on drugs in 1998 (Jelsma 2015: 2). The divide between 
producing and consuming countries widened as well as the animosity between countries 
straying from the treaty path and those staying on it. In the meantime, the physical war 
against drugs was mainly waged in Latin America. The continent suffered from high levels of 
drug production, drug violence and partly due to the military escalation of the drug conflict in 
Latin America, countries such as Colombia and Mexico ‘suffered catastrophic levels of drug-
related violence’ (Caulkins 2013: 3). 
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The first steps towards including actors other than states, occurred when the first advisory 
group was created right after UNGASS 1990. As the Colombian president Barco Vargas had 
suggested, an expert advisory group was created to maximise the effects of the special 
session and assist the Secretary-General. Fifteen international experts had the task to address 
the world’s drug problem, their selection being based on expertise and not as representatives 
of their national governments (A/45/652/Add.1). Notably, this group was established after the 
first UNGASS, effectively limiting their influence on global policy at a special session 
(Jelsma 2015: 2). 
 
Nevertheless, based on the input of this group, a new idea was brought to the doorstep of the 
UN. The Executive Director Giorgio Giacomelli of the UNDCP (later UNODC) proposed in 
1995 that harm reduction be further researched (Jelsma 2015: 6). Harm reduction referred to 
those policies that prioritise the reduction of harm associated with drugs over prohibition 
(IHRA Briefing 2010: 1). Harm reduction initiatives started gaining widespread attention due 
to the rapid spread of AIDS in the middle of the eighties (Riley & O’Hare 1999: 2). As drug 
use is one of the risk factors for getting infected with the HIV-virus, initiatives such as needle 
exchange programmes, proved effective in many European cities. By focusing on the health 
of HIV patients, rather than their drug abuse, the way was paved for a more pragmatic 
approach to drug policy with regard to combating production as well as consumption of 
drugs. Small-scale harm reduction initiatives started receiving global coverage towards the 
end of the twentieth century, but failed to make it onto the UN agenda (A/RES/S-20/2). As 
these initiatives developed, opposition to harm reduction increased simultaneously. The 
prohibition oriented coalition at the UN considered harm reduction as an approach that 
encouraged drug use and provided support for decriminalisation or legalisation of drugs 
(Beirness e.a. 2008: 3). Focusing on health in drug policy, was a slippery slope to all out 
permissiveness towards drugs. 
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6.   The trade-off 
 
The stage for the second UNGASS was set after the Permanent Representative of Mexico to 
the UN sent a letter to the Secretary-General in 1993. The Mexican letter highlighted the 
continued strained relationship of the US with its Southern neighbours. Like Colombian 
president Barco Vargas did just four years earlier, the Mexican representative re-allocated 
responsibility from producing to consuming countries, stating that the ‘most effective means 
of reducing drug production and trafficking is the gradual reduction in current and future 
drug consumption’ (A/C.3/48/2). More importantly, the letter condemned US counternarcotic 
operations in Mexico, accusing the US of ‘attempts to impose hegemony’ through drug 
policy (A/C.3/48/2). Eventually this letter led to the 1998 UNGASS (Jelsma 2003: 184). 
There was a growing discord among the ranks of the UN member states, where reform 
oriented proposals started clashing with the drug prohibition ideology of the dominant 
powers. Hope for a policy debate beyond the existing framework was shattered in 1996 at the 
meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the formal preparatory committee of 
the 1998 UNGASS. The CND is the governing body of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, with members elected from among the United Nations member states, and was 
responsible for producing the draft for the outcome document5. At one of the preparatory 
meetings only a handful of vocal nations expressed active support for reformative alternatives 
i.e. opening up the debate beyond the current UN treaty framework (Jelsma 2015: 7). Due to 
the consensus driven mechanism of the CND, reform oriented suggestions were not hard to 
overrule and controversial issues were erased from the 1998 UNGASS agenda. New ideas 
such as harm reduction, the decriminalisation of coca leaves and cannabis and treaty changes 
would not reach the negotiating table at the GA (Jelsma 2015: 7). 
 
The UNGASS 1998 on the World Drug Problem took place in October, with member states 
reiterating concern about the world drug problem. In 1998 the word ‘scourge’ was replaced 
by a ‘grave threat’, changing from a morally tainted evil to a danger to society (A/RES/S-
20/2). The GA came together to ‘consider enhanced action to tackle it in a spirit of trust and 
cooperation’ (1998 Political Declaration and Plan of Action). Even though the UN Decade 
Against Drug Abuse had intended to establish wider support for the international drug control 
framework, also among the Latin American nations, the intended spirit of trust and 
                                                
5 Retrieved 5 December 2016: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/Membership/Membership.html 
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cooperation did not materialize (Jelsma 2015: 9). Instead, the outcome document of 
UNGASS 1998 represented a trade-off between opposing positions, including prohibition-
oriented ideas as well as harm reduction initiatives. The document contained the rather 
quixotic goal of a drug-free world as well as emphasis on shared responsibility (A/RES/S-
20/2). It committed member states to eliminate, or at least make all possible effort to 
‘massively reducing the illicit production of coca, cannabis and opium, as well as achieving 
large scale demand reduction by 2008’ (Bewley-Taylor 2012: 49). The diplomatic 
compromise was that the term ‘harm reduction’ was avoided throughout the document, but 
the UNGASS 1998 did agree to ‘reduce the negative consequences of drug use’ (Jelsma 
2015: 5). This opened up the way for future diplomatic efforts oriented towards harm 
reduction, an idea that reached beyond the existing prohibitionist framework. By avoiding the 
actual word though, the UN sent a clear message that prohibition was still a priority over 
health oriented reform. 
 
The discussion on including actors other than states had not been put to bed between 1990 
and 1998. In March 1998 SG Kofi Annan appointed an expert advisory group of thirteen 
people from different countries. The key purpose of the expert advisory group was to: 
‘recommend how to strengthen future international cooperation against illicit drugs, and to 
identify measures aimed at reinforcing UNDCP’s activities in the field of drug control, 
including increased financial resources’6. The group convened twice before UNGASS and 
once afterwards (Jelsma 2015: 9). Due to further polarisation within the drug debate and 
because of political pressure from countries with considerable diplomatic clout, re-
assessment of treaty inconsistencies, a review of the results of harm reduction and 
decriminalisation were left out of the mandate of the advisory group (TNI 2015: 4). This 
withheld the group from issuing possibly critical statement that could influence the fragile 
consensus at the General Assembly. The expert group acknowledged that any discussion on 
revising the treaty framework was beyond their mandate, however, ‘there were several 
critical issues affecting the international drug control regime that needed to be dealt with as a 
matter of priority’ (E/CN.7/1999/5). The advisory group noted that the CND was moving 
from a technical UN body towards a more politically oriented organisation, compromising 
the ‘Commission’s ability to deal with substantive measures’ (E/CN.7/1999/5). This 
commission concluded that the current situation ‘was undermining the role of the 
                                                
6 Retrieved 5 December: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/press_release_1998-03-09_2.html 
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Commission as the principal United Nations policy-making body on drug control’ 
(E/CN.7/1999/5). The CND had become limited by the political mandate of its member states 
and therefore compromised its capacity to operate as governing body of the UNODC.  
 
In the meantime, this new idea of harm reduction started to win ground at the UN.  
Successful harm reduction efforts directed at combating HIV/AIDS did not go unnoticed 
during the aftermath of the special session of 1998. In 2001 the GA made its first major 
statement on harm reduction in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS. The 
resolution contained a commitment to make sure that by 2005 a wide range of prevention 
programs would be in place, ‘including harm reduction efforts related to drug use (A/RES/S-
26/2: 7). This paved the way for several advocacy briefs and position papers, emphasising the 
‘importance of harm reduction in national and global HIV responses’ (Wolfe & Csete 2014: 
3). In spite of the 2001 resolution and subsequent efforts, the UN drug control agencies were 
less willing to discuss harm reduction at the UNGA, let alone adopt a unilateral stance on 
harm reduction for fear it would undermine consumption and supply reduction efforts 
(A/RES/S-20/2). Nevertheless, several UN advocacy reports and positions papers published 
by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS have since restated support on harm 
reduction measures (Wolfe & Csete 2014: 3). The next major multilateral breakthrough on 
the harm reduction front occurred in 2014, when UNAIDS published an advocacy brief: 
Harm Reduction Works. The brief stated that: ‘countries should not wait, but should start 
immediately to scale up harm reduction responses that are public health-based and human 
rights informed’ (UNAIDS 2014: 2). Efforts continued by civil society and UNAIDS alike to 
move global drug policy towards a similar stance. 
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7.   The crack in the consensus 
 
The third UNGASS on drugs took place in a very different context from the previous two 
special sessions. In 1990 and 1998 the US was the ‘uncontested champion of hard line 
punitive global counter-narcotics regime’ (Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas 2015: 10). The drug 
policy landscape has changed dramatically since, however (ibid.). As a dominant force in 
international politics and frontrunner of the prohibition coalition, the US now finds itself in a 
‘legally untenable position’, with cannabis legalisation occurring at state level (Jelsma 
2015:18). Therefore, the US finds itself in the ambiguous position in terms of selective 
compliance to a treaty framework it initiated and has promoted abroad (Felbab-Brown & 
Trinkunas 2015: 10). 
 
The stalemate between prohibition-, and progressive oriented policy which dominated the 
second half of the twentieth century came to a head again at the sixth presidential summit of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) in Cartagena, Colombia in 2012. Officially the 
main topic of conversation was the precarious position of Cuba, but after the summit 
president Santos of Colombia announced that the OAS would be tasked with producing a 
report on current drug policy and alternative approaches (Youngers 2015: 23). A year later 
the OAS released a ground-breaking report, radically breaking the status quo of careful treaty 
criticism within the confined spaces of multilateral institutions (OAS 2013: 104). The report: 
‘The Drug Problem in the America’ suggested that the ‘drug problem requires a flexible 
approach, with countries adopting a tailored approach that reflect individual concerns’ (Ibid.). 
Instead of being bogged down by the current framework, the time has come to research 
‘alternative policies, including legalisation of some prohibited substances such as cannabis’ 
(Felbab-Brown & Trinkunas 2015: 4). The report received a mixed response from the 
members of the OAS. Countries such as Uruguay, Guatemala and Colombia welcomed the 
new paradigm while others did not want to stray from the treaty path (Youngers 2015: 25). 
However, the most important outcome of the report was that it provided a ‘roadmap for 
continued regional discussion on drug policy and possible reforms’, most importantly 
between Latin America and US (Ibid.). 
 
The third UNGASS on the world drug problem was initially scheduled to take place in 2019, 
as that was the target date of the 2009 UN Political Declaration ‘to eliminate or reduce 
significantly and measurably’ illicit cultivation, production of drugs, illicit demand and drug-
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related health and social risks (UN 2009: 14). At the annual GA meeting in 2012, the 
presidents of Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala issued an official statement declaring the dire 
need for revisiting the global drug control framework. The three Latin American countries 
called upon the UN to ‘analyse all available options, including regulatory or market 
measures, in order to establish a new paradigm that prevents the flow of resources to groups 
involved in organised crime’ (Declaración Conjunta 2012: 2). The GA decided in December 
2012 to advance the date of the 2019 UNGASS and convene a special session in the first half 
of 2016. The aim of UNGASS 2019 would remain closing the loopholes of ‘the 1961 UN 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances’ (Jelsma 2015: 3).  
 
Similar to the preparation process of UNGASS of 1998, the CND was in charge of preparing 
the first draft of the outcome document. The drafting procedure proceeded mostly behind 
closed doors. Even though in theory the 53 member states of the CND were allowed to 
participate in the preparations, in practice countries were excluded (Bewley-Taylor and 
Jelsma 2016). First of all, most negotiating occurred during informal meetings between 
diplomats and civil servants in Vienna (Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2016). Secondly, most 
countries from the Caribbean or the continent of Africa do not have a permanent mission in 
Vienna, logistically complicating any participation in informal meetings, even with a seat in 
the CND. The political dynamics consequently did not differ much from proceedings at the 
previous UNGASS as the bulk of the discussion took place among like-minded nations 
(Bewley-Taylor and Jelsma 2016). After the CND presented the draft document to the heads 
of states at the UNGASS, the outcome document was adopted on the first day of the summit 
with few changed made to the original version. The document called ‘for greater cooperation 
between nations’ but maintained the existing prohibitionist framework (The Guardian, 20 
April 2016). At UNGASS, the US chose to ‘sidestep a political fight, rather than to provide 
bold leadership’ (Dickinson 2016). Even though the Obama administration has taken steps to 
put drug abuse in the realm of health care, i.e. enabling Obama care to cover drug treatment, 
‘the deeper infrastructure of the War on Drugs remains fundamentally unaltered under 
Obama’ (Dickinson 2016).  
 
The discussion on including actors other than states resurfaced during the preparations for 
UNGASS 2016 (TNI 2016: 2). Uruguay for instance requested the participation of an 
advisory group, tasked with ‘developing operational recommendations to improve the 
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functioning and harmony of the drug control system in the UN’ (National Drug Board 
Presidency of the Republic URUGUAY 2015: 10). Different from previous special sessions 
on drugs, Uruguay requested that the advisory group consist of ‘a balanced selection of 
experts from Member States and regional organisations, relevant UN agencies, civil society 
and academia’ (National Drug Board Presidency of the Republic Uruguay 2015: 10). By 
requesting to include members from civil society and academia, Uruguay made a bold move 
to include non-state actors in order to ‘create better understanding of the drug problem, its 
challenges and new alternatives’ (ibid.). A Civil Society Task Force (CSTF) was created by 
the CND to ‘ensure a balanced and inclusive civil society engagement and coordination in the 
preparatory process of the United Nations’7.  The CSTF would nominate one civil society 
representative, each taking part in one of the five discussions at the special session. The 
outcome document, however, had already been drafted during CND meetings beforehand and 
after the member states adopted it on day one, the input of these hearings was not included 
(Civil Society Statement, March 14th 2016). Diplomats and civil servants had received their 
mandate for the preparatory meetings from their governments and with that negotiated an 
outcome document, which was then agreed upon by the heads of states at the start of the 
special session. Non-state actors did not have the opportunity to discuss drug policy on equal 
footing with state actors. 
 
Even though non-state actors were not included in the decision-making process, some 
external ideas were included at UNGASS 2016. Without employing the exact wording of 
harm reduction, recommendations of the 2016 outcome document include harm reduction 
interventions. In contrast with UNGASS 1990 and 1998, the 2016 outcome document 
recognised ‘drug dependence as a complex, multifactorial health disorder characterised by a 
chronic and relapsing nature with social causes and consequences’ (A/RES/S-30/). The 
UNGASS 1990 referred to drugs as a scourge and in 1998 a grave threat. Referring to drug 
abuse as a health disorder reflected an important change in attitude. As such, paving the way 
for a harm reduction oriented future for drug policy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Retrieved 5 December: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ngos/DCN13-civil-society-engages-in-ungass-2016-
preparatory-process.html 
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8.   An open debate 
 
Considerable effort has been put into how ad-hoc advisory groups, including non-state actors, 
could enhance the outcome of the respective special sessions on drugs. Based on the 
information presented in the previous chapters, I will assess to what extent non-state actors 
have been included in the decision-making process of global drug policy. 
 
The suggestion of an expert advisory group has resurfaced every UNGASS and the input of 
these experts have become part of the debate. However, when looking at the formal 
participation of non-state actors throughout UNGASS 1990 to 2016, it seems that the more 
ambitious the request of outsiders wishing to be involved in the policy-making process, the 
more fruitless the project ends up being. Instead, major conferences seem to be ‘carefully 
choreographed presentations’ rather than fora for open and inclusive debate (Fazey 2002: 
156). The political debate takes behind closed doors, with civil servants and diplomats 
compromising and negotiating a draft document based on the mandate of their specific 
countries before any debate reaches the GA. Simultaneously using the advisory groups as 
poster-child for inclusion, while effectively limiting their influence. The special sessions 
were not a forum for open and inclusive debate, but instead an exchange of ‘statements of 
positions’ between states (Fazey 2002: 156). Any possible disagreements have been solved 
before the heads of state arrive and involvement of civil society after the outcome document 
is agreed upon. It is telling, though, that certain requests have resurfaced to the forefront of a 
debate that spans almost half a decade. This might mean there is hope for those banking on 
reform. For no now, however, there is a formal system in place which ensures that non-state 
actors have no direct influence on the outcome document of the UN General Assembly at 
special sessions. Instead their power lies in relentless lobbying from the outside, influencing 
the ‘development of international norms’ (Friedman e.a. 2006: 22). By mobilising external 
actors to rally behind a certain idea, non-state actors make their political mark. 
 
When addressing the question why states are unwilling to relinquish decision-making powers 
to non-state actors, it is important to bear in mind that the existing drug policy framework 
was initially set in place by the US (Levine 2003: 147). The existing prohibition framework, 
gave the US and other governments ‘additional and military powers’, legitimised by a war on 
drugs (Caulkins 2013: 3). This created a precedent where governments would scapegoat 
drugs for any ‘long-standing problems, recent problems, and the worsening of almost 
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anything’ (ibid.). In the meantime, as the world drug problem did not dissipate, civil society 
became more organized and vocal on the international stage (Weiss e.a. 2013: 4). Non-state 
actors, including civil society, have played an invaluable role through regional, in depth 
expertise and active networks (Weiss e.a. 2013: 4). Only sovereign states have the 
autonomous power to participate in multilateral decision-making, however (ibid.). By 
claiming some of that autonomous power, civil society poses a threat to the legitimation of 
nations. As such, states have struggled to retain certain sovereign prerogatives while 
engaging in ever deeper dialogue with actors in global civil society (Friedman e.a. 2006: 22). 
Moreover, civil society is not limited by an electorate, diplomatic ties or economic interests, 
but functions in service of a cause. As such non-state actors are not necessarily limited by the 
rules of diplomatic engagement. Formal power at said multilateral debate, could alter the 
course of the discussion in an unpredictable way which would be unfavourable for states 
trying to protect their own interests (ibid.). 
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9.   A wide-ranging debate 
 
The first high-level political initiative to include ideas beyond the existing framework; is the 
campaign for harm reduction. Based on the information presented in the previous chapters, I 
will assess to what extent the idea of harm reduction has influenced the debate on drug 
policy.  
 
So far, the UN stance has been marked by inconsistency with regards to harm reduction. As 
is clear from previous chapter, this inconsistency is based on a difference of opinion on what 
the priority should be of drug policy. At the UN there is a conflict between countries pursuing 
a zero tolerance policy towards drugs as mandated by the current framework and those that 
have prioritised harm reduction over supply and demand reduction (Jelsma 2003: 182). Those 
prioritising harm reduction, assert that combatting demand and supply of drugs is secondary 
to reducing harm and therefore supported policies not necessarily focused on combatting 
drugs. Those favouring continued prohibition no matter the cost, refer to harm reduction 
initiatives as a disguise for a more liberal view towards drugs (Jelsma 2003: 182). With EU 
harm reduction experiments as an example, the UN has adopted harm reduction methods for 
AIDS/HIV campaigns. With regard to drug policy, harm reduction remains a difficult topic at 
the UN. After consistent lobbying by non-state actors of civil society and member states in 
favour of harm reduction, the UNGASS 2016 adopted some points regarding human rights 
and proportional sentencing. Nevertheless, a number of powerful countries such as China and 
Russia maintain that ‘criminalisation should remain the cornerstone of the fight against 
drugs’ (New York Times, 25th April 2016).  
 
It is important to note that the current drug UN control framework was created in post-war 
context with a powerful victor and it has remained largely unchanged until this date. 
Specifically producing countries at the UN, feel that the treaty framework was not negotiated 
on equal footing and favours consumer countries. The recurring critical call of Latin 
American nations throughout the three special sessions, reflects the ‘unbalanced political 
power relations under which the three conventions were negotiated’ (Jelsma 2003: 182). 
Even though, UNGASS 2016 took place with the US in a conflicting position, this did not 
mean that at a federal level the US diplomatic efforts would not be directed at defending the 
‘integrity of the conventions and to ensure that treaty revision be kept out of the UNGASS 
debate’ (Jelsma 2015: 22). By ignoring accusations of inconsistency, the US reinforced the 
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existing framework and thus limited the influence of new ideas. As China and Russia, also 
remain strong supporters of the prohibitionist framework, the UN powerhouses remain 
opposed to treaty reform (The Guardian 20 April 2016). By refusing to institutionalise 
reform, the victories that have been achieved on the harm reduction front remain limited. The 
continued influence of former US interests on drug policy has set a system in place, which 
seems mostly impenetrable for outside ideas.  
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10.  Final conclusion 
 
UN drug policy faces structural challenges. Significant changes in the drug policy landscape 
have recently created a complicated platform for debate at UNGASS 2016 and will do so for 
UNGASS 2019. When making up the balance of the three special sessions, it becomes clear 
that this era of drug policy has been marked by increasing divergence on actors and ideas. 
The latest UNGASS document represents a trade-off between the opposing positions, with 
only small victories for those pursuing change. With regard to including non-state actors, it 
seems that over the past three special sessions on drugs, the openness of the UN drug policy 
mechanism has decreased rather than increased. Most recently, in the disguise of a CSTF, the 
CND has attempted to satisfy the demand for an export advisory group. The input, however, 
of the CSTF was largely left out of the outcome document. The previous expert groups 
experienced the same feat, and would only bring about minimal changes. As for including 
new ideas, in spite of strong advocates for keeping the current system in place, harm 
reduction initiatives have made it on to the UN agenda. However, there is still not a 
consistent, unilateral position of the UN on harm reduction.  
 
Ultimately the three special sessions on drugs have become an arena of two dogs fighting 
over the drug policy bone. The outcome documents have merely brought about a trade-off 
between the opposing parties and the longstanding opposition between those advocating 
change and those wishing to retain the status quo, has shifted only slightly. Instead of a 
sustainable and popular solution, the outcome documents have tended to represent the lowest 
common denominator without showing any progression for fear of breaking a fragile 
consensus. On core themes the UN has therefore maintained a largely ambiguous position, 
sometimes entertaining an idea or actor beyond the existing framework, but never relenting 
too much influence on the decision-making process. 
 
The existing treaty framework, dictating strict prohibition, has remained largely untouched 
throughout the three special sessions, despite growing criticism. Instead the goal to pursue a 
world free of drugs has withstood the test of time, with states seemingly losing sight of the 
initial purpose of drug policy. The global framework on drugs was created as the number of 
cocaine related deaths became impossible to ignore. This means that the initial purpose of 
creating a global drug policy framework was reducing the direct harm that drugs inflicted. 
Supply reduction and demand reduction were a means to reduce the harm that drugs caused. 
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However, over time, supply and demand reduction became goals in themselves, regardless of 
human and financial cost. When public health is considered secondary to supply and demand 
reduction, logic has escaped the reasoning process. The prohibition-oriented coalition has 
made the pursuit of a drug free world into a moral crusade. Drugs are bad and must be 
exorcised from communities. Harm reduction is considered a disguise for tolerating morally 
reproachable behaviour of consuming, trafficking or producing drugs. As the prohibition-
oriented coalition consists of strong economic and military countries, countries advocating 
for a different approach have found it hard to oppose the existing framework.  The 
international community has reached the phase where external input is received, however, 
this input has hardly any influence on the output. 
 
When assessing the proceedings at the three special sessions in 1990, 1998 and 2016 in light 
of the theoretical framework, the struggle of external actors and ideas lies at the heart of the 
debate. The global drug policy framework was drafted when the US was a strong power and 
favoured a prohibitionist approach to drugs. This approach was continued throughout the 
strongest days of the US hegemony. Over the years, however, the US monopoly on the drug 
framework has started to show cracks. European harm reduction initiatives and Latin 
American protests against the war on drugs have started challenging the status quo and 
rallying more and more support for their campaign for change from politicians and civil 
society alike. An impartial referee such as an advisory group is therefore an even greater 
threat to the existing framework. As more and more countries are deviating from the current 
treaty framework in their national policies, the international community finds itself 
increasingly polarised on drug policy. With the US as the formerly strongest advocate for 
punitive approaches now gone rogue, UNGASS 2019 takes place under an even more 
polarised backdrop than the previous Special Sessions. Is the UN drug policy mechanism a 
hamster in a wheel incapable of change or will the advocates for the existing framework 
finally relinquish their bone? 
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11.  Policy recommendations for UNGASS 2019 
 
Conduct the debate on drug policy as wide and openly possible. Global challenges such as 
the drug trade have reached a magnitude, complication and interconnectedness, that UN 
member states can no longer sufficiently address the issue. In order to sustainably tackle the 
problems associated with the drug trade, it is necessary to include all sectors of society. This 
means having civil society hearing or the participation of a task force during the negotiating 
of the draft document for UNGASS 2019.  
 
Adopt a more pragmatic instead of moral approach to drug policy. By regarding drugs as 
morally wrong, a system is maintained which disregards constructive approaches. By failing 
to look beyond supply and demand reduction, we lose sight of the original purpose of the 
counter-narcotic effort, namely reducing the suffering caused by drugs. 
 
Accept global policy pluralism. UN member states face different challenges when battling the 
world drug problem. Issues arising from drugs can be due to the production, consumption or 
trafficking of drugs. Uniform policies do not take into account the national differences and 
can therefore not adequately counter the different aspects of the drug trade. By 
acknowledging the failure of a unilateral drug war and uniform policies, a more constructive 
approach might be formulated at UNGASS 2019.  
 
Promote harm reduction policies among the economically powerful nations. Countries with 
extensive experience on harm reduction policies, such as the Netherlands, have a specific 
responsibility of sharing evidence-based harm reduction initiatives. Such countries should not 
de-prioritize drug policy out of diplomatic caution, but rather step up to the forefront of the 
debate. 
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